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Probabilistic Pursuit-Evasion Games: A One-Step Nash Approach (2000)
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Sastry, Shankar Prandini, Maria Hespanha, João P. |
| Description | PROC. OF THE 39TH CONF. ON DECISION AND CONTR |
| Abstract | This paper addresses the control of a team of autonomous agents pursuing a smart evader in a non-accurately mapped terrain. By describing the problem as a partial information Markov game, we are able to integrate map-learning and pursuit. We propose receding horizon control policies, in which the pursuers and the evader try to respectively maximize and minimize the probability of capture at the next time instant. Because this probability is conditioned to distinct observations for each team, the resulting game is nonzero-sum. When the evader has access to the pursuers' information, we show that a Nash solution to the one-step nonzero-sum game always exists. Moreover, we propose a method to compute the Nash equilibrium policies by solving an equivalent zero-sum matrix game. A simulation example shows the feasibility of the proposed approach. |
| File Format | |
| Publisher Date | 2000-01-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Probabilistic Pursuit-evasion Game Non-accurately Mapped Terrain Next Time Instant Partial Information Markov Game Horizon Control Policy Resulting Game Simulation Example Autonomous Agent Nash Equilibrium Policy One-step Nonzero-sum Game Nash Solution Equivalent Zero-sum Matrix Game One-step Nash Approach Smart Evader Evader Try |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
