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Multi-unit bayesian auction with demand or budget constraints.
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Deng, Xiaotie Goldberg, Paul Tang, Bo Zhang, Jinshan |
| Abstract | Abstract. In this work, we study multiple item auctions in a setting where items are distinguished by their relative values; any pair of items have the same ratio of values to all buyers. Buyers have additive valuations for multiple items. The application we have in mind is that items are positions in an ad auction, and an item’s value corresponds to its click-through rate. Buyers have various per-click valuations, which is their private information. We consider a Bayesian model for the values of buyers on the positions. We develop the optimal (maximum revenue) auction for a relaxed demand model (where each buyer i wants at most di items) and a sharp demand model (where buyer i wants exactly di items). We also find a 1/2 approximation for the case when the buyers are budget constrained. 1 |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Budget Constraint Multi-unit Bayesian Auction Di Item Additive Valuation Ad Auction Bayesian Model Private Information Relaxed Demand Model Item Value Sharp Demand Model Multiple Item Auction Various Per-click Valuation Maximum Revenue Click-through Rate Multiple Item Relative Value |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
