EPISTEMIC HUMILITY, ARGUMENTS FROM EVIL, AND MORAL SKEPTICISM

Content Provider	CiteSeerX
Author	Howard-Snyder, Daniel
Abstract	Many arguments from evil at least tacitly rely on something like the following line of thought: The Inference. On sustained reflection, we don’t see how any reason we know of would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world; therefore, there is no reason that would justify God. 1 The conclusion is frequently more nuanced: “it is very likely that there is no such reason ” or “more likely than not ” or “more likely than it otherwise would be”. Some critics reject the premise: we do see how some reason would justify God. These are the theodicists. Others accept the premise but reject the conclusion: the evidence or non-evidential warrant for God’s existence is much better than the evidence for no justifying reason. These are the natural theologians and Reformed epistemologists. Some critics, however, insist that even if the premise is true and even if there isn’t better evidence or non-evidential warrant for God’s existence, we should not infer that there is no justifying reason. 2 These are the agnostics about the Inference. In this essay I aim to assess an increasingly popular objection to agnosticism. There are different versions of agnosticism about the Inference. The one I have in mind— henceforth Agnosticism with a capital A—affirms at least two theses: 3
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Subject Keyword	God Existence Argument Evil Many Argument Capital Affirms Moral Skepticism Reformed Epistemologist Epistemic Humility Mind Henceforth Agnosticism Natural Theologian Non-evidential Warrant Popular Objection Different Version Sustained Reflection Following Line
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