Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
Mechanism design over discrete domains.
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Mu'Alem, Ahuva |
| Abstract | Often, we wish to design incentive-compatible algorithms for settings in which the players ’ private information is drawn from discrete domains (e.g., integer values). Our main result is identifying discrete settings in which an algorithm can be made incentive-compatible iff the function it computes upholds a simple monotonicity constraint, known as weak-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such characterization of incentivecompatibility in discrete domains (such characterizations were previously known only for inherently nondiscrete domains, e.g., convex domains). We demonstrate the usefulness of this result by showing an application to the TCP-inspired congestion-control problem presented in [19]. |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Convex Domain First Characterization Player Private Information Incentive-compatible Algorithm Incentive-compatible Iff Discrete Setting Main Result Discrete Domain Nondiscrete Domain Mechanism Design Discrete Domain Simple Monotonicity Constraint Tcp-inspired Congestion-control Problem |
| Content Type | Text |