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Do participants and observers assess intentions differently during bargaining and conflict? an experiment.
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Dickson, Eric S. |
| Abstract | Political actors in settings of bargaining and conflict often find themselves uncertain about the intentions of their counterparts. This paper explores the psychology of how intentions are assessed using a novel experimental design involving imperfect-information versions of the ultimatum and dictator bargaining games, two paradigmatic models of conflict. Subjects are randomly assigned to one of three roles – the traditional proposer and recipient roles in these games, and a novel impartial observer role. Recipients and observers are given identical, but ambiguous, information about pro-posers ’ offers, and make post-play assessments of proposers ’ intentions that are rewarded based on accuracy. When uncertainty is sufficiently high, recipients ’ assessments of proposers ’ intentions are significantly lower than observers ’ assessments in the ultimatum game, in stark contrast to Bayesian predictions, but there is no evidence of any difference in the dictator game. The results suggest that actors ’ perceptions can be directly affected by the set of strategic alternatives they possess, independent of access to information. One interpretation is that the power to accept or reject may prime individuals to be more critical or negative in forming assessments given ambiguous evidence than they otherwise would be. If correct, this interpretation has important implications for theories of bargaining and conflict, and for the design of institutions for conflict resolution. |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Post-play Assessment Conflict Resolution Strategic Alternative Observer Assessment Bayesian Prediction Actor Perception Proposer Intention Imperfect-information Version Recipient Role Recipient Assessment Important Implication Stark Contrast Traditional Proposer Dictator Game Pro-posers Offer Observer Ass Intention Differently Paradigmatic Model Dictator Bargaining Game Political Actor Ultimatum Game Novel Impartial Observer Role Ambiguous Evidence Novel Experimental Design |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
