NDLI: The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions

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The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Kakade, Sham M. Devanur, Nikhil R.
Abstract	We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the classic explore/exploit dilemma: while gathering information about the click through rates of advertisers, the mechanism may loose revenue; however, this gleaned information may prove valuable in the future for a more profitable allocation. In this sense, such mechanisms are prime candidates to be designed using multi-armed bandit techniques. However, a naive application of multi-armed bandit algorithms would not take into account the strategic considerations of the players -- players might manipulate their bids (which determine the auction's revenue) in a way as to maximize their own utility. Hence, we consider the natural restriction that the auction be truthful. The revenue that we could hope to achieve is the expected revenue of a Vickrey auction that knows the true CTRs, and we define the truthful regret to be the difference between the expected revenue of the auction and this Vickrey revenue. This work sharply characterizes what regret is achievable, under a truthful restriction. We show that this truthful restriction imposes statistical limits on the achievable regret -- the achievable regret is $Θ(T^{2/3}),$ while for traditional bandit algorithms (without the truthful restriction) the achievable regret is $Θ(T^{1/2})$ (where T is the number of rounds). We term the extra $T^{1/6}$ factor, the `price of truthfulness'.
Starting Page	99
Ending Page	106
Page Count	8
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781605584584
DOI	10.1145/1566374.1566388
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2009-07-06
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Regret Truthful Pay-per-click Auction Online Multi-armed bandit
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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