NDLI: Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences

Please wait, while we are loading the content...

Lattice-based FHE as secure as PKE

On the structure of boolean functions with small spectral norm

Invitation games and the price of stability

Private interactive communication across an adversarial channel

Adversarial hypothesis testing and a quantum stein's lemma for restricted measurements

Black-box obfuscation for d-CNFs

Attribute-efficient evolvability of linear functions

Testers and their applications

Deterministic compression with uncertain priors

Approximation schemes via Sherali-Adams hierarchy for dense constraint satisfaction problems and assignment problems

Decompositions of triangle-dense graphs

Direct sum fails for zero error average communication

Cryptogenography

Non-commutative arithmetic circuits with division

The computational hardness of pricing compound options

Tree codes and a conjecture on exponential sums

Sequential decision making with vector outcomes

Candidate weak pseudorandom functions in $AC^{0}$ ○ $MOD_{2}$

An efficient algorithm for finding the ground state of 1D gapped local hamiltonians

Expanders with respect to Hadamard spaces and random graphs: extended abstract

Faster private release of marginals on small databases

Complexity of approximating CSP with balance / hard constraints

Partial tests, universal tests and decomposability

Rational arguments: single round delegation with sublinear verification

Limits of random oracles in secure computation

Decision trees, protocols and the entropy-influence conjecture

Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences

Capacity of non-malleable codes

Learning mixtures of arbitrary distributions over large discrete domains

Iterated group products and leakage resilience against NC1

Energy-efficient circuit design

On the automorphism groups of strongly regular graphs I

Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy

Integer feasibility of random polytopes: random integer programs

High dimensional expanders and property testing

Optimal provision-after-wait in healthcare

Robust device independent quantum key distribution

Locally testable codes and cayley graphs

Coordination mechanisms from (almost) all scheduling policies

Linear-time encodable codes meeting the gilbert-varshamov bound and their cryptographic applications

Why do simple algorithms for triangle enumeration work in the real world?

Building one-time memories from isolated qubits: (extended abstract)

Rate-independent computation in continuous chemical reaction networks

Limits of local algorithms over sparse random graphs

Redrawing the boundaries on purchasing data from privacy-sensitive individuals

Multireference alignment using semidefinite programming

Parameterized testability

The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem

Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Swamy, Chaitanya Chakrabarty, Deeparnab
Abstract	In this paper, we study mechanism design problems in the ordinal setting wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents can compare outcomes, but aren't able to evaluate precise utilities for them. Such a situation arises in diverse contexts including voting and matching markets. Our paper addresses two issues that arise in ordinal mechanism design. To design social welfare maximizing mechanisms, one needs to be able to quantitatively measure the welfare of an outcome which is not clear in the ordinal setting. Second, since the impossibility results of Gibbard and Satterthwaite [14, 25] force one to move to randomized mechanisms, one needs a more nuanced notion of truthfulness. We propose rank approximation as a metric for measuring the quality of an outcome, which allows us to evaluate mechanisms based on worst-case performance, and lex-truthfulness as a notion of truthfulness for randomized ordinal mechanisms. Lex-truthfulness is stronger than notions studied in the literature, and yet flexible enough to admit a rich class of mechanisms circumventing classical impossibility results. We demonstrate the usefulness of the above notions by devising lex-truthful mechanisms achieving good rank-approximation factors, both in the general ordinal setting, as well as structured settings such as (one-sided) matching markets, and its generalizations, matroid and scheduling markets.
Starting Page	105
Ending Page	120
Page Count	16
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781450326988
DOI	10.1145/2554797.2554810
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2014-01-12
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Mechanism design Computational social choice theory Matroids Linear programming Ordinal preferences Truthfulness for randomized mechanisms Algorithmic game theory Social welfare and rank approximation
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences (2014)

Welfare Maximization and Truthfulness in Mechanism Design with Ordinal Preferences

A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents

Approaching utopia: strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms

Towards More Practical Linear Programming-based Techniques for Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Black-box randomized reductions in algorithmic mechanism design

Budget Feasible Mechanisms

Towards More Practical Linear Programming-based Techniques for Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Black-box randomized reductions in algorithmic mechanism design (2010)

Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences

Similar Documents

Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences (2014)

Welfare Maximization and Truthfulness in Mechanism Design with Ordinal Preferences

A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents

Approaching utopia: strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms

Towards More Practical Linear Programming-based Techniques for Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Black-box randomized reductions in algorithmic mechanism design

Budget Feasible Mechanisms

Towards More Practical Linear Programming-based Techniques for Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Black-box randomized reductions in algorithmic mechanism design (2010)

Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences