NDLI: Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design

Please wait, while we are loading the content...

On aggregation bias in sponsored search data: existence andimplications

Optimal bidding in multi-item multi-slot sponsored search auctions

Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements

Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction

Online prophet-inequality matching with applications to ad allocation

Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks

Finding overlapping communities in social networks: toward a rigorous approach

Strategyproofness in the large as a desideratum for market design

On bitcoin and red balloons

Dynamic pricing with limited supply

Optimal mechanisms for selling information

Optimization with demand oracles

Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement

Social influence in social advertising: evidence from field experiments

Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited information

Mechanisms and allocations with positive network externalities

Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view

A bayesian market maker

Computing dominance-based solution concepts

Send mixed signals: earn more, work less

The groupon effect on yelp ratings: a root cause analysis

Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification

Approximate pure nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: existence, efficient computation, and structure

Traffic shaping to optimize ad delivery

Ad serving using a compact allocation plan

Tatonnement in ongoing markets of complementary goods

How to schedule a cascade in an arbitrary graph

Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals

Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design

Asymptotically optimal algorithm for stochastic adwords

The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions

Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles

Simpler sybil-proof mechanisms for multi-level marketing

A tractable combinatorial market maker using constraint generation

Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers

Finding a walrasian equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agents

Clone structures in voters' preferences

Signaling schemes for revenue maximization

Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets

Interviewing secretaries in parallel

Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data

Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding

Safe opponent exploitation

A truthful learning mechanism for contextual multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities

The structure of online diffusion networks

Improving the effectiveness of time-based display advertising

Mean field equilibria of multiarmed bandit games

Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items

Secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders

Striving for social status

Information and the value of execution guarantees

Accuracy improvements for multi-criteria recommender systems

Behavioral experiments on a network formation game

Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions

Matching models for preference-sensitive group purchasing

To match or not to match: economics of cookie matching in online advertising

Two-sided search with experts

Coalitional bargaining in networks

Local bargaining and endogenous fluctuations

Privacy-aware mechanism design

Profit-charging market makers with bounded loss, vanishing bid/ask spreads, and unlimited market depth

Beyond dominant resource fairness: extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities

Conducting truthful surveys, cheaply

Supply-limiting mechanisms

The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information

Lossy stochastic game abstraction with bounds

Market user interface design

Computing a proper equilibrium of a bimatrix game

Bayesian sequential auctions

Cooperation and assortativity with endogenous partner selection

Single-call mechanisms

Peer prediction without a common prior

Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules

Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Daskalakis, Constantinos Weinberg, Seth Matthew
Abstract	We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent additive bidders with arbitrary demands when either the number of bidders is held constant or the number of items is held constant. In the first setting, we need that each bidder's values for the items are sampled from a possibly correlated, item-symmetric distribution, allowing different distributions for each bidder. In the second setting, we allow the values of each bidder for the items to be arbitrarily correlated, but assume that the distribution of bidder types is bidder-symmetric. These symmetric distributions include i.i.d. distributions, as well as many natural correlated distributions. E.g., an item-symmetric distribution can be obtained by taking an arbitrary distribution, and "forgetting" the names of items; this could arise when different members of a bidder population have various sorts of correlations among the items, but the items are "the same" with respect to a random bidder from the population. For all ∈>0, we obtain a computationally efficient additive ∈-approximation, when the value distributions are bounded, or a multiplicative (1-∈)-approximation when the value distributions are unbounded, but satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate condition, covering a widely studied class of distributions in Economics. Our running time is polynomial in max{#items,#bidders}, and not the size of the support of the joint distribution of all bidders' values for all items, which is typically exponential in both the number of items and the number of bidders. Our mechanisms are randomized, explicitly price bundles, and in some cases can also accommodate budget constraints. Our results are enabled by several new tools and structural properties of Bayesian mechanisms, which we expect to find applications beyond the settings we consider here; indeed, there has already been follow-up research [Cai et al. 2012; Cai and Huang 2012] making use of our tools in both symmetric and non-symmetric settings. In particular, we provide a symmetrization technique that turns any truthful mechanism into one that has the same revenue and respects all symmetries in the underlying value distributions. We also prove that item-symmetric mechanisms satisfy a natural strong-monotonicity property which, unlike cyclic-monotonicity, can be harnessed algorithmically. Finally, we provide a technique that turns any given ∈-BIC mechansism (i.e. one where incentive constraints are violated by ∈) into a truly-BIC mechanism at the cost of O(√∈) revenue.
Starting Page	370
Ending Page	387
Page Count	18
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781450314152
DOI	10.1145/2229012.2229042
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2012-06-04
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Revenue optimization Auction theory Pricing Symmetries Multi-dimensional mechanism design
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Central Library (ISO-9001:2015 Certified)
Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur
Kharagpur, West Bengal, India | PIN - 721302

See location in the Map
03222 282435
Mail: support@ndl.gov.in

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in