NDLI: Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer

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Multi-attribute exchange market: representation and indexing of orders

Convergent algorithms for collaborative filtering

Pricing and QoS of information services in a competitive market [Extended Abstract]

Efficiency through feedback-contingent fees and rewards in auction marketplaces with adverse selection and moral hazard

Profit guaranteeing mechanisms for multicast networks

k-Implementation

Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design

Envy-free auctions for digital goods

Budget balanced mechanisms for the multicast pricing problem with rates

Playing large games using simple strategies

Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Correlated equilibria in graphical games

AutONA: a system for automated multiple 1-1 negotiation

A polynomial-time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games

Intermediaries in an electronic trade network [Extended Abstract]

Agent-based service composition through simultaneous negotiation in forward and reverse auctions

Extensions of the spending constraint model: existence and uniqueness of equilibria [Extended Abstract]

Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation

An agent-based framework for dynamic multi-period continuous double auctions in B2B exchanges

On cheating in sealed-bid auctions

Combinatorial auction across independent markets [Extended Abstract]

A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids

A strategic decision model for multi-attribute bilateral negotiation with alternating

On the core of the multicommodity flow game

Certifying data from multiple sources [Extended Abstract]

How much can taxes help selfish routing?

Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency

Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games

Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions

Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling

Price prediction in a trading agent competition [Extended Abstract]

Selling online versus offline: theory and evidences from Sotheby's

Profit-maximizing multicast pricing by approximating fixed points [Extended Abstract]

Searching dynamically bundled goods with pairwise relations

Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design

Betting boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas

A performance model for a BPI middleware

Computation in a distributed information market

Multi-agent implementation of asymmetric protocol for bilateral negotiations (extended abstract)

Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions

Using value queries in combinatorial auctions

On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries

A reputation-based trust model for peer-to-peer ecommerce communities [Extended Abstract]

Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core

Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer

Collaboration software to reduce inventory and increase response

Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids

Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation

Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design

Computing the outcome of proxy bidding in combinatorial auctions extended abstract

Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity scheduling

Reputation rating system based on past behavior of evaluators

Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality

End-user tools for debugging e-commerce

Improving learning performance by applying economic knowledge

A nonparametric estimator for setting: reserve prices in procurement auctions

Polyhedral sampling for multiattribute preference elicitation

Information incorporation in online in-Game sports betting markets

Tracking results from multichannel marketing programs on electronic commerce

Identity-based confirmer signatures from pairings over elliptic curves

Storage allocation in web prefetching techniques

Semantic and syntactic interoperability: in transactional systems

A semantic web environment for context-aware m-commerce

Effects of information feedback loops on supply chain performance

The policy analysis market: an electronic commerce application of a combinatorial information market

The digital signage exchange: a virtual marketplace for out-of-home digital advertising

Baby bond connect: software for combined value trading

Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations

Incentive compatible open constraint optimization

Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing

Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Conitzer, Vincent Sandholm, Tuomas
Abstract	Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to make the chosen outcome more favorable to themselves. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully, and a desirable outcome is chosen. We recently proposed an approach---called automated mechanism design---where a mechanism is computed for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time. Unlike the earlier work on automated mechanism design that studied a benevolent designer, in this paper we study automated mechanism design problems where the designer is self-interested. In this case, the center cares only about which outcome is chosen and what payments are made to it. The reason that the agents' preferences are relevant is that the center is constrained to making each agent at least as well off as the agent would have been had it not participated in the mechanism. In this setting, we show that designing optimal deterministic mechanisms is NP-complete in two important special cases: when the center is interested only in the payments made to it, and when payments are not possible and the center is interested only in the outcome chosen. We then show how allowing for randomization in the mechanism makes problems in this setting computationally easy.
Starting Page	232
Ending Page	233
Page Count	2
File Format	PDF
ISBN	158113679X
DOI	10.1145/779928.779974
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2003-06-09
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Automated mechanism design Game theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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