NDLI: A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with Circumvention

Please wait, while we are loading the content...

Can Censorship Measurements Be Safe(r)?

A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with Circumvention

Web Identity Translator: Behavioral Advertising and Identity Privacy with WIT

Do You Know Where Your Headers Are? Comparing the Privacy of Network Architectures with Share Count Analysis

Handling a trillion (unfixable) flaws on a billion devices: Rethinking network security for the Internet-of-Things

Destroying networks for fun (and profit)

A First Step Towards Leveraging Commodity Trusted Execution Environments for Network Applications

SpaceHub: A Smart Relay System for Smart Home

Room-Area Networks

One Hop for RPKI, One Giant Leap for BGP Security

RiPKI: The Tragic Story of RPKI Deployment in the Web Ecosystem

Bootstrapping Evolvability for Inter-Domain Routing

Why didn't my (great!) protocol get adopted?

High Speed Networks Need Proactive Congestion Control

Taking an AXE to L2 Spanning Trees

Xpander: Unveiling the Secrets of High-Performance Datacenters

Micro Load Balancing in Data Centers with DRILL

Time's Forgotten: Using NTP to understand Internet Latency

Leveraging the Power of Cloud for Reliable Wide Area Communication

Re-evaluating Measurement Algorithms in Software

Enabling a "RISC" Approach for Software-Defined Monitoring using Universal Streaming

Transparency Instead of Neutrality

Towards Programmable Packet Scheduling

Universal Packet Scheduling

Differential Provenance: Better Network Diagnostics with Reference Events

Automated Network Repair with Meta Provenance

A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with Circumvention

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Qazi, Ihsan Ayyub Uzmi, Zartash Afzal Kashaf, Aqsa Nisar, Aqib
Abstract	Existing research on Internet censorship primarily focuses on either measurements or circumvention. Considering these two in isolation often leads to designs with limited capabilities: Circumvention is not driven by measurement data and end users find little incentive to help gather such data. We present the preliminary design and implementation of C-Saw, a platform that offers both. The circumvention capability of C-Saw incentivizes consumers to opt-in. As more and more consumers crowdsource, the monitoring data gets richer. This, in turn, offers greater insights into the censorship mechanisms over a wider region, offering even better circumvention capabilities. C-Saw is a browser-based platform set up as a lightweight client-side proxy. C-Saw adapts its circumvention approach to the particular censorship mechanism deployed by a user's ISP, achieving a better balance of circumvention effectiveness and performance. In addition, it can also leverage the heterogeneity in filtering mechanisms across ISPs to achieve better circumvention performance. We demonstrate this using page load times across various ISPs and locations in a censored region. Unlike previous measurement approaches, C-Saw does not require the knowledge of a target URL to be tested. In fact, as URLs get blocked, their information can be monitored in real time.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	7
Page Count	7
File Format	PDF MP4
ISBN	9781450340472
DOI	10.1145/2834050.2834110
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2015-11-16
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Internet measurements Censorship Circumvention
Content Type	Audio Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with

Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship

Unobservable Covert Streaming for Internet Censorship Circumvention

Internet Censorship Circumvention Tools: Escaping the Control of the Syrian Regime

Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship

Facet: Streaming over Videoconferencing for Censorship Circumvention

Practical Censorship Evasion Leveraging Content Delivery Networks

GAME OF DECOYS: Optimal Decoy Routing Through Game Theory

How the great firewall of china is blocking tor.

A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with Circumvention

Similar Documents

A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with

Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship

Unobservable Covert Streaming for Internet Censorship Circumvention

Internet Censorship Circumvention Tools: Escaping the Control of the Syrian Regime

Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship

Facet: Streaming over Videoconferencing for Censorship Circumvention

Practical Censorship Evasion Leveraging Content Delivery Networks

GAME OF DECOYS: Optimal Decoy Routing Through Game Theory

How the great firewall of china is blocking tor.

A Case for Marrying Censorship Measurements with Circumvention