NDLI: Mix and match

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Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects

Computing pure strategy nash equilibria in compact symmetric games

Congestible services and network effects

Optimal online assignment with forecasts

Revenue maximization with a single sample

Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract

A new understanding of prediction markets via no-regret learning

The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing

Collective wisdom: information growth in wikis and blogs

Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule

Efficiency with linear prices: a theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction.

Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies

Prediction without markets

Auctions with online supply

Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation

Approximating pure nash equilibrium in cut, party affiliation, and satisfiability games

Innovation, openness & platform control

Matching in networks with bilateral contracts: extended abstract

Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers

Approximate privacy: foundations and quantification (extended abstract)

Information aggregation in smooth markets

Assessing regret-based preference elicitation with the UTPREF recommendation system

Cooperation in anonymous dynamic social networks

The unavailable candidate model: a decision-theoretic view of social choice

Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition

Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games

Cooperation and competition in strategic games with private information

Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market

Auctions with intermediaries: extended abstract

Composition of markets with conflicting incentives

Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games

Market design & analysis for a P2P backup system

Fast algorithms for finding matchings in lopsided bipartite graphs with applications to display ads

The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design

Better vaccination strategies for better people

Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets: effects of trading mechanism and information distribution

Recommender systems and their effects on consumers: the fragmentation debate

A behavioral study of bargaining in social networks

A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation

Northern exposure: a field experiment measuring externalities between search advertisements

Truthful assignment without money

Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions

A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker

Mix and match

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Kash, Ian Ashlagi, Itai Fischer, Felix Procaccia, Ariel D.
Abstract	Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to maximize the number of matches despite self-interest, with agents that each want to maximize the number of their own vertices that match. Each agent can choose to hide some of its vertices, and then privately match the hidden vertices with any of its own vertices that go unmatched by the mechanism. A prominent application of this model is to kidney exchange, where agents correspond to hospitals and vertices to donor-patient pairs. Here hospitals may game an exchange by holding back pairs and harm social welfare. In this paper we seek to design mechanisms that are strategyproof, in the sense that agents cannot benefit from hiding vertices, and approximately maximize efficiency, i.e., produce a matching that is close in cardinality to the maximum cardinality matching. Our main result is the design and analysis of the eponymous Mix-and-Match mechanism; we show that this randomized mechanism is strategyproof and provides a 2-approximation. Lower bounds establish that the mechanism is near optimal.
Starting Page	305
Ending Page	314
Page Count	10
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781605588223
DOI	10.1145/1807342.1807392
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2010-06-07
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Approximate mechanism design without money Kidney exchange
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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