NDLI: Signaling Competition and Social Welfare

Please wait, while we are loading the content...

Signaling Competition and Social Welfare

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Polevoy, Gleb Tennenholtz, Moshe Smorodinsky, Rann
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	We consider an environment where sellers compete over buyers. All sellers are a-priori identical and strategically signal buyers about the product they sell. In a setting motivated by online advertising in display ad exchanges, where firms use second price auctions, a firm’s strategy is a decision about its signaling scheme for a stream of goods (e.g., user impressions), and a buyer’s strategy is a selection among the firms. In this setting, a single seller will typically provide partial information, and consequently, a product may be allocated inefficiently. Intuitively, competition among sellers may induce sellers to provide more information in order to attract buyers and thus increase efficiency. Surprisingly, we show that such a competition among firms may yield significant loss in consumers’ social welfare with respect to the monopolistic setting. Although we also show that in some cases, the competitive setting yields gain in social welfare, we provide a tight bound on that gain, which is shown to be small with respect to the preceding possible loss. Our model is tightly connected with the literature on bundling in auctions.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	16
Page Count	16
File Format	PDF
ISSN	21678375
e-ISSN	21678383
DOI	10.1145/2560766
Volume Number	2
Issue Number	1
Journal	ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2014-03-01
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Competition Efficiency Equilibrium Market Social welfare
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics Marketing Computational Mathematics Statistics and Probability Computer Science

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

A Rational Convex Program for Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets

Competitive Shopbots-Mediated Markets

The Complexity of Fairness Through Equilibrium

Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium

The AND-OR Game

Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization

Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox

The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces

Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms

Signaling Competition and Social Welfare

Similar Documents

A Rational Convex Program for Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets

Competitive Shopbots-Mediated Markets

The Complexity of Fairness Through Equilibrium

Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium

The AND-OR Game

Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization

Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox

The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces

Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms

Signaling Competition and Social Welfare