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Sequential rationality in cryptographic protocols

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Livne, Noam Gradwohl, Ronen Rosen, Alon
Copyright Year	2013
Abstract	Much of the literature on rational cryptography focuses on analyzing the strategic properties of cryptographic protocols. However, due to the presence of computationally-bounded players and the asymptotic nature of cryptographic security, a definition of sequential rationality for this setting has thus far eluded researchers. We propose a new framework for overcoming these obstacles, and provide the first definitions of computational solution concepts that guarantee sequential rationality. We argue that natural computational variants of subgame perfection are too strong for cryptographic protocols. As an alternative, we introduce a weakening called threat-free Nash equilibrium that is more permissive but still eliminates the undesirable “empty threats” of nonsequential solution concepts. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we revisit the problem of implementing a mediator for correlated equilibria [Dodis et al 2000], and propose a variant of their protocol that is sequentially rational for a nontrivial class of correlated equilibria. Our treatment provides a better understanding of the conditions under which mediators in a correlated equilibrium can be replaced by a stable protocol.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	38
Page Count	38
File Format	PDF
ISSN	21678375
e-ISSN	21678383
DOI	10.1145/2399187.2399189
Volume Number	1
Issue Number	1
Journal	ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2013-01-30
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Nash equilibrium Rational cryptography Correlated equilibrium Cryptographic protocols Sequential rationality Subgame perfect equilibrium
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics Marketing Computational Mathematics Statistics and Probability Computer Science

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