NDLI: IP Covert Channel Detection

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ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 18

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 17

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 16

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 15

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ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 12

Issue 4, April 2009

Resiliency Policies in Access Control

Universally Composable RFID Identification and Authentication Protocols

IP Covert Channel Detection

Issue 3, January 2009

Issue 2, December 2008

Issue 1, October 2008

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 11

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 10

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 9

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 8

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 7

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 6

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 5

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 4

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 3

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 2

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) : Volume 1

IP Covert Channel Detection

Content Provider	ACM Digital Library
Author	Cabuk, Serdar Brodley, Carla E. Shields, Clay
Copyright Year	2009
Abstract	A covert channel can occur when an attacker finds and exploits a shared resource that is not designed to be a communication mechanism. A network covert channel operates by altering the timing of otherwise legitimate network traffic so that the arrival times of packets encode confidential data that an attacker wants to exfiltrate from a secure area from which she has no other means of communication. In this article, we present the first public implementation of an IP covert channel, discuss the subtle issues that arose in its design, and present a discussion on its efficacy. We then show that an IP covert channel can be differentiated from legitimate channels and present new detection measures that provide detection rates over 95%. We next take the simple step an attacker would of adding noise to the channel to attempt to conceal the covert communication. For these noisy IP covert timing channels, we show that our online detection measures can fail to identify the covert channel for noise levels higher than 10%. We then provide effective offline search mechanisms that identify the noisy channels.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	29
Page Count	29
File Format	PDF
ISSN	10949224
e-ISSN	15577406
DOI	10.1145/1513601.1513604
Volume Number	12
Issue Number	4
Journal	ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Language	English
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publisher Date	2009-04-01
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Network covert channels Channel detection Information hiding
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Science Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Detecting Covert Channels in Computer Networks Based on Chaos Theory

Pattern-Based Survey and Categorization of Network Covert Channel Techniques

Out-of-Band Covert Channels—A Survey

Covert channels in multiple access protocols

Predictable Three-Parameter Design of Network Covert Communication Systems

Detecting covert timing channels using non-parametric statistical approaches

A Timing Channel Spyware for the CSMA/CA Protocol

Anomalous system call detection

Ip covert timing channels: design and detection (2004)

IP Covert Channel Detection

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Detecting Covert Channels in Computer Networks Based on Chaos Theory

Pattern-Based Survey and Categorization of Network Covert Channel Techniques

Out-of-Band Covert Channels—A Survey

Covert channels in multiple access protocols

Predictable Three-Parameter Design of Network Covert Communication Systems

Detecting covert timing channels using non-parametric statistical approaches

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Anomalous system call detection

Ip covert timing channels: design and detection (2004)

IP Covert Channel Detection